Norberto del Prado and the ontological root of Spinozist monism

Abstract

If we were to remove the act-potential composition between essentia and esse in the line of the created entity, we would necessarily be thrown into Spinozist monism, that is, to admit that there is only one substance (a) unique, (b) infinite, (c) uncreated, (d) necessarily existent, (e) pure act, (f) identified, ultimately, with the very substance of God. In chapter LII of the second book of the Summa contra gentiles, Saint Thomas derives these divine attributes from seven arguments which aim to prove that, in the case that the real difference between essentia and esse in the finite entity –both material and immaterial– were not accepted, we should necessarily recognise that there is only one substance with the six attributes mentioned above (each argument gives rise to a different attribute, except for the first two which lead to the same one, namely that of uniqueness). In the present article, following Norberto del Prado’s interpretation, we intend to show how Spinozist monism can be refuted through the doctrine of Saint Thomas in two stages: the first is represented by the aforementioned chapter of the Summa contra gentiles; the second, by the fourth way (Summa Theologiae, I, q.2, a.3).